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TECHNOLOGICAL OPACITY & 
PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE 
SETH KATSUYA ENDO* 
Abstract: From Google’s auto-correction of spelling errors to Netflix’s movie 
suggestions, machine-learning systems are a part of our everyday life. Both pri-
vate and state actors increasingly employ such systems to make decisions that 
implicate individuals’ substantive rights, such as with credit scoring, govern-
ment-benefit eligibility decisions, national security screening, and criminal sen-
tencing. In turn, the rising use of machine-learning systems has led to question-
ing about whether they are sufficiently accurate, fair, and transparent. This Arti-
cle builds on that work, focusing on how opaque technologies can subtly erode 
the due process norm of participation. To illuminate this issue, this Article ex-
amines the use of predictive coding—a form of technology-assisted review in 
which supervised machine-learning software is taught to predict the relevance of 
collected documents for discovery productions. The use of predictive coding in 
civil discovery highlights the new challenge to the participation norm because 
the processes generally do not provide any explanations for the outputs, much 
less non-technological accounts that are tied to the underlying substantive legal 
issues. Thus, even if predictive coding results in reasonably complete, accurate, 
and cost-efficient productions, the “black-box” nature of the process may harm 
the legitimacy that comes from litigants understanding and being able to more 
fully participate in judicial processes. This harm, however, has not been ad-
dressed by the developing jurisprudence, probably because most of the early 
cases involved high-stakes litigation between sophisticated parties who could 
afford computer experts. But the participation issue—and related equality con-
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cerns—will become increasing problematic as the technology’s use expands be-
yond this privileged posture. In response to these issues, this Article proposes a 
reinvigorated Mathews framework that explicitly weighs predictive coding’s 
impact on the participation norm to better futureproof the doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
From Google’s auto-correction of spelling errors to Netflix’s movie sug-
gestions, machine-learning systems are a part of our everyday life. These sys-
tems typically use software to “detect patterns in data[] and then use the un-
covered patterns to predict future data[] or to perform other kinds of decision 
making under uncertainty.”1 Both private and state actors increasingly em-
ploy machine-learning systems to make decisions that implicate individuals’ 
substantive rights, such as with credit scoring, government-benefit eligibility 
decisions, national security screening, probable cause determinations, and 
criminal sentencing.2 In turn, the rising use of machine-learning systems has 
led to questioning about whether they are sufficiently accurate, fair, and 
transparent.3 This Article builds on that work, focusing on how opaque tech-
nologies can subtly erode the due process norm of participation. 
This Article specifically examines the use of predictive coding—a form 
of technology-assisted review in which supervised machine-learning software 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 148, 160–61 (2016) (quoting KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC 
PERSPECTIVE (2012)). 
 2 See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of 
Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1251–53 (2017); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank 
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(2014); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1284 
(2008) (noting the invocation of balancing tests when substantive rights are at stake); Nizan Ges-
levich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to Be Unnetworked, 2016 COL-
UM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 350; Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algo-
rithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 886–91 (2016); Daniel J. Solove, 
Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 344–45 (2008); Katherine 
Freeman, Recent Development, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed 
to Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 75, 76 (2016), 
http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Terra_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB24-AFYT]. 
 3 See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to 
Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks., PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://
www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.
cc/7RKG-CSJV] (discussing lack of algorithm reliability in predicting violent crime); Mitch 
Smith, A Case Is Putting the Use of Data to Predict Defendants’ Futures on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 2016, at A18 (discussing the implications of predictive coding in State v. Loomis). Com-
pare Alison Gopnik, Review, The Curious Incident of the Baby in the Lab, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 
2015, at C2 (describing a study exploring human predictive capability), with CATHY O’NEIL, 
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS 
DEMOCRACY 8 (2016) (examining the lack of explanation for the outputs of complex algorithms). 
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is taught to predict the relevance of collected documents for discovery pro-
ductions. The use of predictive coding in civil discovery highlights the new 
challenge to the participation norm particularly clearly because the processes 
generally do not provide any explanations for the outputs, much less non-
technological accounts that are tied to the underlying substantive legal issues. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on predictive coding in civil discovery is 
warranted because several factors suggest it will be used with increasing fre-
quency. As computers—from desktops to smartphones—become ever more 
omnipresent, the amount of electronically stored information (ESI) continues 
to rise, creating significant logistical and cost challenges for civil litigants.4 In 
response to these complications, the 2015 amendments to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b) integrated a requirement that discovery be “proportion-
al to the needs of the case” directly into the definition of its scope.5 Together, 
these developments present a risk that essential discovery in cases involving 
individual small-value claims against large defendants will be stifled, raising 
the need for a technological fix like predictive coding.6 
To make this more concrete, one might see the issues presented by the 
rise in ESI and the proportionality command arise in an employment discrim-
ination suit brought by an individual against a multinational company. In such 
a case, the employee’s claim is worth comparatively little and the information 
about both the employee and his or her comparators that would potentially 
show discriminatory patterns may be contained in a large number of emails 
and human resources documents that are dispersed across a broad swathe of 
the company.7 The average corporate worker sends or receives more than one 
hundred emails per day.8 To exceed one hundred thousand documents, a case 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Andrew Jay Peck, Foreword, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013–2014) (discussing the 
growing volume of ESI and growing discovery costs for litigants). 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also Christi-
na T. Nasuti, Comment, Shaping the Technology of the Future: Predictive Coding in Discovery 
Case Law and Regulatory Disclosure Requirements, 93 N.C. L. REV. 222, 234–36 (2014) (refer-
encing predictive coding’s relationship to the scope of discovery). 
 6 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An 
Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1593 (2015) (describing evolution of rulemaking); 
Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1112–13 (2015) (explaining how an aggressive proportionality command 
may lead to less discovery that harms plaintiffs because of information asymmetries). 
 7 See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 507, 545 (2011) (emphasizing the need for robust discovery in employment discrimination 
cases); see also Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
481, 483–84 (1994) (illuminating the twin purposes of discovery through the example of an em-
ployment discrimination suit). 
 8 Harrison M. Brown, Comment, Searching for an Answer: Defensible E-Discovery Search 
Techniques in the Absence of Judicial Voice, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 407, 411 (2012). 
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would only need to involve three supervisors emailing over a twelve-month 
period. Thus, one can imagine predictive coding being offered as a cost-
effective answer to the proportionality inquiry in a challenge to the scope of 
discovery.9 In other words, predictive coding is a technological fix that might 
make the low-value employment discrimination claim viable. 
Additionally, the use of predictive coding in legal processes is a particu-
larly timely issue. In its various forms, predictive coding has received a great 
deal of attention from practitioners, the academy, and the public at large.10 At 
the same time, the use of predictive coding is still in its early stages and the 
jurisprudence remains mutable.11 
The existing academic literature and case law on the use of predictive 
coding in civil discovery have focused on its practical implementation, ad-
dressing (1) its accuracy and economic efficiency in culling voluminous ESI 
for responsive materials;12 (2) the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1993 holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;13 and (3) professional responsibility issues such as 
maintaining technological prowess, preventing unauthorized practice of law, 
or protecting attorney-work-product.14 This body of scholarship and law, 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Ralph C. Losey, Predictive Coding and the Proportionality Doctrine: A Marriage Made in 
Big Data, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 7, 54–55 (2013-2014) (extolling the benefits of predictive coding in 
discovery); see also Monica Bay, Predictions for 2016 and the Changing E-Discovery Landscape, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/predictions-for-2016-and-the-changing-e-
discovery-landscape [https://perma.cc/4LMJ-KP2N] (suggesting future trends for e-discovery); Sa-
mantha Ettari, Kramer Levin E-Discovery Update: 2015—A Year in Review, MONDAQ, Jan. 13, 
2016, 2016 WLNR 1157330 (forecasting changes to discovery based on 2015 developments). 
 10 See, e.g., Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1691, 1692 (2014); Laura L. Gavioli, Tax Court Order Indicates That E-Discovery and Predictive 
Coding Are Here to Stay, NAT’L L. REV., July 18, 2016, 2016 WLNR 21821542; Catherine Ho, 
Law Firm Discovers Cash in E-Discovery, WASH. POST, July 21, 2014, 2014 WLNR 19857825.  
 11 In 2012, Magistrate Judge Peck first approved the use of predictive coding. Moore v. Publi-
cis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe 
SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012). 
 12 E.g., Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Predictive Coding: A Trial Court Judge’s Perspective, 26 
REGENT U. L. REV. 71, 72 (2013); Remus, supra note 10, at 1693; Charles Yablon & Nick 
Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding: Emerging Questions and Concerns, 64 S.C. L. REV. 633, 665 
(2013). 
 13 E.g., Daniel K. Gelb, The Court as Gatekeeper: Preventing Unreliable Pretrial eDiscovery 
from Jeopardizing a Reliable Fact-Finding Process, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1287–88 (2014); 
David J. Waxse & Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, Experts on Computer-Assisted Review: Why Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 Should Apply to Their Use, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 207, 207 (2013). See gener-
ally FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 14 E.g., John M. Facciola & Philip J. Favro, Safeguarding the Seed Set: Why Seed Set Docu-
ments May Be Entitled to Work Product Protection, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); Monica 
McCarroll, Discovery and the Duty of Competence, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 81, 85 (2014); Dana 
Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 541–51 (2017); Remus, supra note 10, at 1692. 
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however, has neglected to consider both a key attribute and a following im-
plication of most—if not all—predictive coding processes: they are not de-
signed to provide easily intelligible explanations that rely on the substantive 
meaning of the materials.15 This deficit can negatively impact the due process 
norm of participation for litigants who lack the financial resources for com-
puter experts. 
So far, courts have primarily addressed the use of predictive coding in 
discovery in cases involving sophisticated, well-resourced litigants who were 
able to employ experts in the technology, sidestepping the intelligibility is-
sue.16 But, this sort of privileged posture is not the standard in civil litigation 
as a whole.17 Thus, the jurisprudence does not necessarily raise all of the is-
sues—whether going to practical implementation or higher normative val-
ues—with which the judiciary must ultimately wrestle in its managerial role. 
Predictive coding’s lack of easy intelligibility implies that the process 
will require either the expense of experts or trust in a “black-box” process.18 
To the former, regardless as to whether the procedural protections for the use 
of experts apply, the expense of experts could destroy the economic value of 
many small-value individual claims.19 To the latter, even if predictive coding 
results in more accurate and cost-effective productions,20 the “black-box” 
nature of the process may harm the element of legitimacy that comes from 
litigants understanding and being able to more fully participate in judicial 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra notes 62–249, 292–370, and accompanying text. 
 16 See generally Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (mining com-
panies with market caps in excess of twenty-five billion dollars each used predictive coding). Com-
pany profiles for Rio Tinto PLC and Vale S.A. are available online. See Rio Tinto PLC, YAHOO FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/RIO [https://perma.cc/LPG7-CFVX] (last visited Feb. 3, 2018); 
Vale S.A., YAHOO FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/VALE [https://perma.cc/D9FV-P9WF] 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
 17 Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2016). 
 18 Remus, supra note 10, at 1705. 
 19 Theodore J. Greeley, The Plight of Indigent Defendants in a Computer-Based Age: Main-
taining the Adversarial System by Granting Indigent Defendants Access to Computer Experts, 16 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 400, 403 (2011); see also David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert 
Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281, 285–91 (1990) (describing the 
negative impact the absence of experts may have on cases brought by indigent parties); Hannah 
Jacobs Wiseman, Pro Bono Publico: The Growing Need for Expert Aid, 60 S.C. L. REV. 493, 
528–35 (2008) (discussing the limited number of experts or expert associations providing pro 
bono testimony). 
 20 Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery 
Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 11, 52 (2011). 
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processes—dimensions of efficacy wholly different than the accuracy and 
cost efficiency of a discovery production.21 
Courts, however, have focused nearly exclusively on economic efficien-
cy in their proportionality inquiries.22 If this doctrine calcifies, the resulting 
law will disadvantage plaintiffs with small-value claims and undermine the 
due process norm of participation. To rectify this and better futureproof this 
jurisprudence, courts should explicitly include the non-financial values of the 
parties’ understanding and participation in the courts’ Mathews-style assess-
ments of predictive coding’s cost and benefits in civil discovery.23 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the relevant federal rules regulat-
ing civil discovery, their normative goals, and the standard doctrinal frame-
work for discovery disputes. Part II provides a brief description of how pre-
dictive coding in civil discovery actually works, the reasons it is coming to 
the fore, and the jurisprudential landscape. Part III examines the dual-edged 
nature of predictive coding with a focus on the normative trade-off between 
accuracy and cost efficiency on one hand and knowledgeable participation on 
the other. The intervention it argues for is making courts explicitly include 
this trade-off in the cost-benefit weighing undertaken in their management of 
predictive coding. It also includes a short discussion of possible non-doctrinal 
solutions that could reduce the problematic elements of the trade-off such as 
technological or professional development advances that increase the trans-
parency of the predictive coding processes. The Article concludes with a 
summary of the foregoing points and the broader lesson that can be drawn. 
I. THE NORMATIVE GOALS, AND INCREASING SUBSTANTIVE  
RIGHT, OF CIVIL DISCOVERY 
The first step in evaluating the evolving jurisprudence of predictive cod-
ing in civil discovery is to identify the normative goals that the relevant pro-
cedural rules are designed to achieve.24 Describing these goals provides the 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 154–55 (2011); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation 
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 600 (2001). 
 22 See infra notes 166–201 (describing cases discussing proportionality); see also Coleman, 
supra note 17, at 1007. 
 23 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1824 (2015) (noting 
the value in considering the litigants’ acceptance of the result); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 323–49 (1976) (establishing the well-known balancing test for weighing due process 
interests); supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 287, 302 (2010) (proposing revised language for Rule 1 based on the normative goals of 
the Federal Rules); Redish, supra note 21, at 600 (considering discovery in the context of the 
broader goals of litigation). 
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measure by which a court—or other observer—should gauge the success of 
the emerging doctrine.25 Additionally, as applied in civil discovery, the under-
lying goals give the rules something approaching a constitutional dimen-
sion.26 And, at a high level, the existing doctrinal framework already attempts 
to balance a set of interests that include, at least, some of these goals.27 
Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure all speak to 
discovery and disclosure.28 Most disputes involving the use of predictive cod-
ing in civil discovery turn on the issue of scope.29 Accordingly, Rule 26(b)(1) 
is the most relevant provision. It states: 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is 
as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivi-
leged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of 
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the par-
ties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and wheth-
er the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not 
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.30  
The text demonstrates the main objective highlighted in Rule 26 is pro-
portionality, which is grounded in the listed constituent factors. This tends to 
turn into a question of economic efficiency with its subparts of accuracy and 
cost effectiveness.31 But the text of Rule 26 alone does not provide any inter-
pretative guidance as to the weighting of these factors, much less as to any 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Implicitly, this assumes a variant of Hart and Sacks’ Legal Process approach, wherein 
judges engage in reasoned elaboration that tie their decisions to democratically decided goals. See 
William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48 SMU 
L. REV. 1811, 1815 (1995). 
 26 Vivian Grosswald Curran, United States Discovery and Foreign Blocking Statutes, 76 LA. 
L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2016); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Ac-
cess to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 464 (1991); Imre Stephen Szalai, A Constitutional 
Right to Discovery? Creating and Reinforcing Due Process Norms Through the Procedural La-
boratory of Arbitration, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 337, 374–75 (2015). 
 27 See, e.g., Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 189 (balancing the accuracy and comprehensiveness of a 
given discovery review method against its costs to determine its value relative to other review 
methods). 
 28 FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
 29 See infra notes 292–370 and accompanying text. 
 30 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 31 See infra notes 292–370 and accompanying text; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Elec-
tronic Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 89 
(1992) (discussing the constituent sub-goals of efficiency). 
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other overarching norms that may apply.32 And, when considering both the 
structural role and institutional competence of the federal courts, it is not ob-
vious that courts are the collective body best situated to generate the social 
objectives to be served by the procedural rules.33 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, are not completely si-
lent about the norms they aim to serve. Rule 1 describes the code’s broad 
purpose as being “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.”34 This provides some statutory guidance as to 
the higher aspirations of civil procedure, which must inform the interpreta-
tions of the other rules.35 
As applied to discovery more specifically, Rule 1 has been understood 
as prohibiting unfair surprises, promoting an exchange of information suffi-
cient for each side to assert their claims or defenses, and to avoid unnecessari-
ly prolonged litigation.36 Notwithstanding these common formulations that 
focus on these fairly tactical objectives,37 the primary placement of the term 
“just” in Rule 1 suggests an emphasis on higher-level norms that extend be-
yond simply ensuring parties have material that might help them win their 
cases.38 This is in keeping with the history of the discovery rules, which were 
originally designed to permit liberal discovery with an eye towards providing 
parties with important information necessary to ultimately pursue a disposi-
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, “Just a Bit Outside!”: Proportionality in Federal Discov-
ery and the Institutional Capacity of the Federal Courts, 34 REV. LITIG. 655, 661 (2015) (suggest-
ing an absence of normative guides in the procedural rules). As to the other goals, even the pro-
portionality inquiry itself implicates a wider set of normative goals than just cost-efficiency. See 
infra notes 292–370 and accompanying text. 
 33 See Genetin, supra note 32, at 661 (concluding the social implications for bounding dis-
covery may fall outside the scope of judicial expertise). 
 34 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 35 See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 517, 520 (2012) (highlighting the central role of proportionality in discovery). See generally 
Bone, supra note 24 (suggesting amendments to Rule 1 to better serve the purposes of the Federal 
Rules). 
 36 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 716 (1998). 
 37 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (describing the goal as “adequately 
informing the litigants in civil trials”); JAY E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE § 9:2, at 510–11 (3d ed. 2010); John S. Becker-
man, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 534–35 (2000) (discuss-
ing the relationship between discovery and pleadings); Morgan, supra note 12, at 76 (examining 
the speed of predictive coding). 
 38 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. This is, of course, not to imply that these pragmatic goals are unim-
portant or unrelated to the participation norm that is the focus of this Article. Nor is it meant to 
imply that these scholars and courts are not mindful of the normative questions. 
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tion on the merits of the case—that is, to give the parties a chance to be 
heard.39 
Elaborating on these themes, scholars have articulated additional dis-
covery-specific norms. For example, some scholars have described a truth-
seeking function.40 Professor Martin Redish argues that the procedural rules 
regulating discovery should promote the following high-level goals: “(1) de-
cisionmaking accuracy; (2) adjudicatory efficiency; (3) political legitimacy; 
(4) maintenance of the substantive-procedural balance; (5) predictability; and 
(6) fundamental fairness.”41 This articulation by Professor Redish echoes the 
concerns outlined in Professor Lawrence Solum’s seminal work on procedur-
al justice, which identified participation and accuracy as the two main princi-
ples.42 
According to Professor Solum, the participation principle encompasses 
the benefits of process that are not reducible to either accuracy or cost.43 To 
ground these benefits, he posits that adjudicative processes are only legiti-
mate if they afford an opportunity for participation from those who are bound 
to the decisions.44 Less abstractly, Professor Solum writes, “The right of par-
ticipation is the right to observe, to make arguments, to present evidence, and 
to be informed of the reasons for a decision.”45 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Subrin, supra note 36, at 710, 716 (describing the development of procedural rules over 
time); see also Colman, supra note 23, at 1811–12; Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Re-
thinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 282 (2009); Edson R. 
Sunderland, An Inquiry Concerning the Functions of Procedure in Legal Education, 21 MICH. L. 
REV. 372, 381–82 (1923). 
 40 E.g., Yitshak Cohen, The Issue of Document Disclosure in General Courts and in Family 
Courts: A New Model, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 43, 60 (2015). 
 41 Redish, supra note 21, at 593. 
 42 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 305–07 (2004). Professor 
Laurence Tribe’s divisions between instrumentalist and intrinsic due process values reach much 
the same concepts. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 
1988); see also Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 524; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The 
Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1489 (1991); Frank I. Michelman, The 
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights—Part II, 1974 
DUKE L.J. 527, 543; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and 
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 487 (1986) (discussing Michelman’s 
Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process); Solum, supra note 42, at 277–82. 
Professor Michelman locates the source of this general right to participate primarily in the me-
tatext of the Constitution, analogizing to the right-to-vote jurisprudence. Michelman, supra note 
42, at 543. 
 43 Solum, supra note 42, at 275. At the same time, Professor Solum asserts that the participa-
tion principle does not rely on dignity, equality, or autonomy grounds. Id. at 286–90. But, even if 
one accepts this proposition, these values are still linked to participation. Id.; see also Robert G. 
Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 561 passim (1993). 
 44 Solum, supra note 42 at 279–80. 
 45 Id. at 280. 
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When thinking about how the participation norm plays out in ordinary 
discovery, the exchange of facts is both an expression of and a prerequisite 
for voice and information gathering.46 And typically, the sorting processes 
used in discovery—such as the use of keywords for screening documents—
are causatively tied to the substantive law. This clear, intelligible link to the 
substance adds to the voice and information-gathering aspects of participa-
tion. Additionally, it contributes to the overall transparency of the reasoning 
involved in the court-superintended party decisions. 
The accuracy principle conjectures that process choices should enhance 
the likelihood that the ultimate outcome of an adjudicative proceeding will be 
substantively correct.47 This applies to discovery because the information-
exchange processes are meant to aid this instrumentalist purpose by giving 
each party—and, ultimately, the court—the information necessary to judge 
the case.48 
Current accounts of procedural justice continue to expound upon Profes-
sor Solum’s two principles of participation and accuracy while also explicitly 
elevating cost efficiency.49 Cost efficiency is effectively embedded in the text 
of Rule 26, so, unsurprisingly, it has a central place in the new jurisprudence 
around predictive coding in civil discovery.50 But, the participation principle 
is going under-examined and under-emphasized—in contrast to accuracy and 
cost efficiency. 
No matter which articulation of the elements of procedural due process 
one applies to discovery, all normative goals flow from a conception of pro-
cedural due process that is at the heart of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Accordingly, to the extent that the discovery rules aid the ability of a 
party to present their claim in a manner that is fundamentally fair, they are 
imbued with an almost-constitutional weight.51 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 21, at 154; Redish, supra note 21, at 600; Solum, supra 
note 42, at 268. 
 47 See Solum, supra note 42, at 306. 
 48 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
 49 See Solum, supra note 42, at 275; see also Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Proce-
dural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1633, 1649–51 (2017). Note also how these norms can be either 
reinforcing or in tension with each other. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, On the Costs of Civil Jus-
tice, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2115, 2118 (2002). 
 50 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 51 Curran, supra note 26, at 1141. In its operation, the discovery rules also might implicate 
individual constitutional rights. Miller, supra note 26, at 464. For example, Professor Arthur Mil-
ler has identified how the judiciary’s management of discovery processes can infringe on both 
privacy and property rights. Id. Additionally, the modern tradition of liberal, trans-substantive 
discovery should ultimately lead to the privileging of the goals of the underlying substantive law, 
which might involve constitutional rights. See Curran, supra note 26, at 1141. Finally, some 
scholars have argued that there is a more general constitutional root of civil procedure in the due 
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Scholars are not the only ones to identify the quasi-constitutional dimen-
sions of civil discovery.52 For example, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that fundamental fairness was violated when a dis-
trict court’s denials of letter rogatory requests under Rule 28 meant that the 
plaintiff had no ability to prove her case.53 Writing for the court, Judge A. 
Leon Higginbotham explained, “Due process mandates that a judicial pro-
ceeding give all parties an opportunity to be heard on the critical and decisive 
allegations which go to the core of the parties’ claim or defense and to present 
evidence on the contested facts.”54 
Ultimately, in assessing whether procedural rules—like those governing 
civil discovery—comply with the constitutional command of procedural due 
process, courts typically use the balancing test that was set forth in 1975 in 
Mathews v. Eldridge.55 In Mathews, the U.S. Supreme Court balanced the 
extent to which additional or alternative processes would prevent the errone-
ous deprivation of the private interest at stake against the costs to the gov-
ernment and adverse parties of adopting the proposed procedural safe-
guards.56 This test has been applied to processes available to private litigants 
in civil litigation.57 
Although a court might not explicitly identify its balancing of the inter-
ests at play in discovery disputes as a Mathews-style test, functionally, that is 
what happens in the predictive coding cases.58 Further illustrating both the 
pervasiveness and importance of this particular balancing inquiry in questions 
of civil procedure, the concerns about whether additional, potentially costly 
discovery processes were warranted can be seen underlying the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Constitutional 
Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 588 (1984). 
 52 See, e.g., In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 108, 126 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that “alt-
hough a litigant has no general constitutional right to discovery, there may be circumstances under 
which specific discovery must be afforded as a matter of due process[]”); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 56 
So. 3d 1283, 1287–88 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the conceptual link between discovery 
and the non-arbitrary and non-capricious decision making of a court); Jimenez v. Brooks, No. 
LLICV146011314S, 2016 WL 1443594, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2016); cf. Wardius v. 
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473–74 (1973) (suggesting justice is better served by liberal discovery, 
reducing surprise at trial, and enhancing fairness). 
 53 In re Complaint of Bankers Tr. Co., 752 F.2d 874, 889 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 54 Id. at 890 (emphasis omitted). 
 55 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334; see also In re Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d at 890; 
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Dis-
covery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2010) (describing the significance and wide applicability of the 
Mathews balancing test). 
 56 Blair-Stanek, supra note 55, at 11. 
 57 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991). 
 58 See infra notes 166–201; see also Citron, supra note 2, at 1284. 
2018] Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice 833 
Court’s 2007 and 2009 decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ash-
croft v. Iqbal.59 
The balancing test, as applied in Mathews, included all three elements of 
procedural justice described above: accuracy, cost-efficiency, and participa-
tion.60 Thus, the critical problem in the existing jurisprudence of predictive 
coding in civil discovery is not the general framework. Instead, the issue is 
that courts have effectively ignored the procedural justice requirement of 
meaningful participation. 
In civil discovery, courts have primarily focused on whether the use of 
predictive coding is accurate and efficient. But the new wrinkle of predictive 
coding in civil discovery is that the processes frequently cannot provide ex-
planations for their results that are tied to the underlying legal substance, if 
they can give an explanation at all. Explanations are a necessary component 
of the due process norm of participation.61 Taken together, this leads to the 
conclusion that courts should explicitly assess the damage done to the partici-
pation norm in their’ Mathews-style assessments of predictive coding’s cost 
and benefits in civil discovery. 
II. OVERVIEW OF PREDICTIVE CODING IN CIVIL DISCOVERY 
A. How Predictive Coding in Civil Discovery Actually Works 
A basic understanding of the mechanics of how predictive coding in civ-
il discovery actually works is vital to evaluating the jurisprudential ramifica-
tions of its use.62 This section provides a short primer on this, focusing on the 
technologies that are used in civil litigation.63 As part of this, it discusses how 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 558 (2007); Blair-Stanek, supra note 55, at 11; Szalai, supra note 26, at 372; Jonah B. Gel-
bach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Ac-
cess to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2285 (2012); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey 
Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 
438 (2013); cf. Subrin, supra note 36, at 745 (noting the Advisory Committee suggestion that 
automatic discovery should mirror the fact particularity in an opponent’s pleading). 
 60 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 339, 345 (noting existence of evidentiary hearing, albeit after 
termination, and contrasting the procedure with those in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)); 
Solum, supra note 42, at 309–10 (noting Mathews’ consistency with the participation principle). 
 61 See Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
297, 299 (1982) (linking the reasons requirement and individual participation); Solum, supra note 
42, at 280. 
 62 Remus & Levy, supra note 14, at 503–04. 
 63 The invaluable and authoritative Grossman-Cormack Glossary is a helpful resource for 
additional vocabulary and, thus, there is no need to replicate that here. See generally The Gross-
man-Cormack Glossary of Technology-Assisted Review with Foreword by John M. Facciola, U.S. 
Magistrate Judge, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Grossman-Cormack Glossary]. 
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predictive coding processes are both less transparent and less tied to the un-
derlying substantive meaning of the documents than earlier search techniques. 
Although the term “predictive coding” appears frequently in the case 
law, academic literature, and vendor promotional material, its meaning must 
still be pinned down.64 Myriad discovery vendors—including some promi-
nent legal-industry players such as FTI, kCura (Relativity), Recommind, and 
Symantec—provide predictive coding processes.65 But the offerings vary sig-
nificantly.66 For the purposes of this Article, the term “predictive coding” re-
fers to review processes that use supervised machine-learning algorithms to 
categorize material based on experts’ coding of training sets of documents. 
More concretely, a typical predictive coding process would generally en-
tail the following steps.67 First, an initial training set of documents (referred 
to as a “seed set”) is either randomly or deliberately selected. Next, a subject-
matter expert codes the documents for a particular attribute or set of attributes 
(in civil discovery, relevance is the typical category). Computer software uses 
the coded seed set to generate a model that is designed to predict the likeli-
hood that other documents have the sought attributes based on shared fea-
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Grossman-Cormack Glossary, supra note 63, at 6; see also Shannon Brown, Peeking 
Inside the Black Box: A Preliminary Survey of Technology Assisted Review (TAR) and Predictive 
Coding Algorithms for eDiscovery, 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 221, 239 (2016). The 
Grossman-Cormack Glossary defines “predictive coding” as: “An industry-specific term generally 
used to describe a Technology-Assisted Review process involving the use of a Machine Learning 
Algorithm to distinguish Relevant from Non-Relevant Documents, based on Subject Matter Ex-
pert(s)’ Coding of a Training Set of Documents.” Grossman-Cormack Glossary, supra note 63, at 
26. This definition, however, has been criticized for being too specific in restricting the sorting to 
relevant and non-relevant. Brown, supra note 64, at 262. Conversely, others have suggested addi-
tional elements, asserting that “predictive coding” must meet all of the following: (1) “Integrated, 
keyword-agnostic analytics to quickly generate accurate seed sets”; (2) “Language and keyword-
agnostic machine-learning technology to accurately find relevant documents during the ‘training’ 
process”; (3) “A sound and well-documented workflow”; (4) “Integrated sampling to verify results 
to a statistical certainty before, during and after review”; and (5) “A completely integrated, pur-
pose-built system to ensure results are consistent throughout the entire process, every time.” Sha-
ron D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Predictive Coding: A Rose by Any Other Name, L. PRAC., July–
Aug. 2012, at 22. 
 65 See Peter J. Corcoran, III, Strategies to Save Resources and Reduce E-Discovery Costs in 
Patent Litigation, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 105–06 (2013). 
 66Nelson & Simek, supra note 64, at 24; Nicholas Barry, Note, Man Versus Machine Review: 
The Showdown Between Hordes of Discovery Lawyers and a Computer-Utilizing Predictive-
Coding Technology, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 343, 355 (2013).  
 67 The description of the general process comes from discussions with e-discovery experts, ven-
dor promotional material, and descriptions in many of the academic sources cited throughout this 
Article. See, e.g., Remus, supra note 10, at 1701–02; see also EDISCOVERY INST., EDISCOVERY 
INSTITUTE SURVEY ON PREDICTIVE CODING (2010), http://www.discovia.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/2010_EDI_PredictiveCodingSurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MRN-DUAY]. 
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tures. 68 The model is then applied to uncoded documents, scoring each one. 
Next, a subject-matter expert reviews these results and the model is revised 
based on the new input. A final human review or statistical validation is fre-
quently the final step before production. 
Functionally, all of the models’ methods are ways to find similarities that 
allow for categorization and scoring based on various inputs such as key-
words or custodians.69 At this level of abstraction, they do not appear so dif-
ferent than human legal reasoning, which generally takes the form of analo-
gizing.70 And, implicitly assuming this similarity, the general rules of discov-
ery have been imported to this new context.71 In this vein, the Sedona Con-
ference has argued that courts should not impose greater transparency and 
validation requirements on predictive coding discovery processes (as com-
pared to traditional methods) because the new technologies have generally 
demonstrated their reliability in the end productions.72 But a key difference is 
that even sophisticated legal entities likely require expert assistance in inter-
preting how the new technologies work in predictive coding.73 
For the more sophisticated predictive coding products (and more gener-
ally in the wider universe of similar machine-learning algorithms), the ma-
chine-generated correlations do not privilege intelligible explanations that 
explain the relationship to the substantive legal issues.74 To the contrary, the 
tendency is for effective models to become so complex that even the original 
                                                                                                                           
 68 The methods used to develop the models—and the models themselves—can take many 
forms. Barry, supra note 66, at 355; Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How 
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services 
Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 946 (2013). For example, some predictive coding processes use 
logistic regression, which finds a best-fit line to separate different classes of points. Brown, supra 
note 64, at 266. Others might employ support vector machines, which draw a separating hyper-
plane with margins that provide a buffer. Id. at 270–71; Grossman-Cormack Glossary, supra note 
63, at 31. Also used are Bayesian algorithms, which estimate statistical probabilities that are based 
on observed prior outcomes. Brown, supra note 64, at 274–76; Grossman-Cormack Glossary, 
supra note 63, at 9. While the preceding methods do not comprise an exhaustive list, they illus-
trate some of the mechanisms that underlie more robust predictive coding processes. 
 69 Katz, supra note 68, at 955. 
 70 Id. at 954–55. 
 71 See Redish, supra note 21, at 571–74. 
 72 SEDONA CONF., COMMENTARY ON DEFENSE OF PROCESS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 
FOR DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A SOUND E-DISCOVERY PROCESS 31–34 (2016). 
 73 See Redish, supra note 21, at 591; see also Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 191 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing value of expert testimony in decision); L. Casey Auttonberry, Predic-
tive Coding: Taking the Devil Out of the Details, 74 LA. L. REV. 613, 622–23 (2014) (discussing 
the need for counsel to consult with experts when engaging predictive coding services). 
 74 Katz, supra note 68, at 950 & n.198. This issue—that is, the lack of a substantive tie—has 
been examined in other contexts, such as credit scoring. See, e.g., Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 
1, at 151 (discussing a credit card company’s unwillingness to explain their rationale for slashing a 
consumer’s credit limit). 
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programmers may not be able to explain the mechanics that led to the out-
put.75 And enhancing intelligibility can require a reduction in the complexi-
ty—and accuracy—of these processes.76 But, as Professor Daniel Martin 
Katz puts it, the operative question has simply been, “Can your model predict 
better than the leading existing approach?”77 
This Article posits the importance of an additional question: Does your 
model provide intelligible, non-technical explanations that are tied to the un-
derlying legal issues? In an exhaustive manual review, at least theoretically, a 
requesting party could seek explanations from the producing attorneys that 
would presumably be justified by a causative relationship to the legal issues 
in the case.78 And the attorneys are able to draw on their perspectives and un-
derstanding that might extend beyond the case contours and previously re-
viewed documents.79 In this way, humans are probably better at dealing with 
unique or novel issues.80 Likewise, Boolean and keyword searches generally 
involve—and, certainly, permit—negotiations in which the review instruc-
tions are tied to the legal issues.81 
But, once the training sets have been coded, predictive coding models 
lack these characteristics—that is, the ability to discuss how the mechanisms 
are tied to the substance of the case, particularly if the connections present a 
novel relationship.82 Instead, the models rely on complex mechanisms that 
require technical expertise to unpack.83 This expertise will likely not be avail-
able to litigants who lack significant resources.84 The most explanation one 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Rich, supra note 2, at 886; see also Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 
1271 (2016) (discussing “black box” concerns in the criminal context); Zeynep Tufekci, Algo-
rithmic Harms Beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of Computational Agency, 13 
COLO. TECH. L.J. 203, 208–09 (2015) (contrasting presentation of information from traditional 
print media with Facebook news feed algorithms). 
 76 Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1520. 
 77 Katz, supra note 68, at 949–50; see also Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 12, at 652. 
 78 See George M. Cohen, The Multilawyered Problems of Professional Responsibility, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1409, 1442 (discussing vicarious liability between lawyers, which creates a chain 
of responsibility that links a client to the attorneys doing the work even, for example, in a context 
in which contract attorneys are engaged in voluminous discovery tasks); Cassandra Burke Robert-
son, A Collaborative Model of Offshore Legal Outsourcing, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 125, 174–76 (2011) 
(describing methods for promoting client accountability even when legal work is outsourced). 
 79 See Rich, supra note 2, at 897. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 12, at 663. 
 82 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text; see also Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s 
Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3072 (2014) (suggesting 
rapid, accurate outputs, rather than discernible methods, are the principle virtue of technology in 
law). 
 83 Remus, supra note 10, at 1715. 
 84 Id. This, of course, is not a problem that only arises in the context of predictive coding—
but the financial inequities are exacerbated with this sort of opaque, highly complex technology. 
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would expect to see from predictive coding software would be the weight 
table—that is, the correlative value of specific document features—that the 
model identified and employed.85 Accordingly, even though predictive coding 
should not be held to a higher standard than other review processes as to out-
put, it raises different questions about how the process itself is developed and 
managed.86 
B. Factors Contributing to the Increasing Prevalence  
of Predictive Coding in Civil Discovery 
Since its first court approval five years ago, the use of predictive coding 
in civil discovery has rapidly grown. The factors contributing to this growth 
suggest the prevalence will continue to increase, spreading to cases involving 
less sophisticated parties than those who have used it to date. This section 
first describes the rise of predictive coding in case mentions and survey re-
sults. It then discusses the interrelated factors leading to the increase: the 
growth of ESI, lawyers’ gamesmanship in civil discovery, the proportionality 
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and technological inno-
vation. 
In February 2012, Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck was the first federal 
judge to approve the use of predictive coding in a written decision, bringing 
attention to the practice and ushering in its use.87 Three more orders address-
ing predictive coding appear in Westlaw’s 2012 case database.88 Six orders 
show up in the 2013 case database.89 Eleven orders are found in the 2014 da-
                                                                                                                           
See generally Richard H. Agins, An Argument for Expanding the Application of Rule 53(b) to 
Facilitate Reference of the Special Master in Electronic Data Discovery, 23 PACE L. REV. 689 
(2003) (suggesting special masters could better balance competing interests in electronic discov-
ery); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (theorizing remedies for resource imbalance in litigation 
generally). 
 85 See Joseph H. Looby, E-discovery—Taking Predictive Coding Out of the Black Box, FTI J. 
(Nov. 2012), http://ftijournal.com/uploads/pdf/FTI%20Journal%20-%20E-discovery%20-%20
Taking%20Predictive%20Coding%20Out%20of%20the%20Black%20Box.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z6P5-SJL7]. 
 86 SEDONA CONF., supra note 72, at 31–34; cf. Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 191 (discussing devel-
opment and management of the keyword search process). 
 87 Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 192. 
 88 Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012), objections overruled by, No. 10 C 5711, 2013 WL 120240 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 9, 2013); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-MD-2299, 2012 WL 
7861249, at *3 (W.D. La. July 27, 2012); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87, 109–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 89 Hinterberger v. Catholic Health Sys., Inc., No. 08-CV-380S(F), 2013 WL 2250591, at *1 
(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Gordon v. Kaleida Health, No. 08-CV-378S(F), 2013 WL 2250506, at 
*27 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., Cause 
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tabase.90 There was a slight dip in discovery orders in the 2015 database back 
to the 2013 level.91 But this might be due to a decline in the need for judicial 
discussion, which might follow from the growing pervasiveness of predictive 
coding’s use in practice.92 
Surveys of legal practitioners confirm the increasing use of predictive 
coding in civil discovery. For example, in a 2013 survey of large American 
law firms, 62% reported using predictive coding and 71% increased their use 
in the prior year.93 Demand was even stronger with 81% of responding firms 
reporting client requests for the tool.94 
A 2015 survey of federal agency attorneys, paralegals, records managers 
and IT professionals showed similar trends.95 The survey found that 27% of 
                                                                                                                           
No. 3:12-MD-2391, 2013 WL 1729682, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2013); Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691(LAK), 2013 WL 1087236, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013), adhered 
to on reconsideration, No. 11 Civ. 0691(LAK), 2013 WL 1975439 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013); 
Harris v. Subcontracting Concepts, LLC, Civ. No. 1:12-MC-82 (DNH/RFT), 2013 WL 951336, at 
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2013); EORHB, Inc. v. HOA Holdings LLC, No. C.A. 7409-VCL, 2013 
WL 1960621, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2013). 
 90 In re Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *9 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 
2014); Arnett v. Bank of Am., No. 3:11-cv-1372-SI, 2014 WL 4672458, at *9 (D. Or. Sept. 18, 
2014); United States v. Univ. of Neb. at Kearney, No. 4:11CV3209, 2014 WL 4215381, at *3 (D. 
Neb. Aug. 25, 2014); In re Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., No. 12cv1737 JM (JLB), 2014 WL 3867495, 
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014); Bridgestone Ams., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 3:13-1196, 
2014 WL 4923014, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 22, 2014); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Delaney, No. 
2:11-cv-00678-LRH-PAL, 2014 WL 3563467, at *11 (D. Nev. July 18, 2014); United States v. 
ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., No. 4:13-CV-00355 KGB, 2014 WL 2593781, at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 
10, 2014); F.D.I.C. v. Bowden, No. CV413-245, 2014 WL 2548137, at *13 (S.D. Ga. June 6, 
2014); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Fed. Hous. 
Fin. Agency v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6189(DLC), 2014 WL 584300, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014); Dynamo Holdings Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 183, 184 (2014). 
 91 Knauf Insulation, LLC v. Johns Manville Corp., No. 1:15-cv-00111-WTL-MJD, 2015 WL 
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respondents used predictive coding in 2015. This was a slight increase from 
23% in 2014, 17% in 2013, and 6% in 2012.96 
More survey data showed 55% of responding legal practitioners identi-
fying predictive coding as a strategy that they will use to “manage eDiscovery 
volume, cost, and risk in the next six to twelve months.”97 Only 10% of re-
spondents said that they did not ever use predictive coding in civil discov-
ery.98 The majority of respondents (52%) used predictive coding in up to 20% 
of their cases.99 At the high end, 6% of respondents used predictive coding in 
over 80% of their cases.100 
Although this Article focuses on domestic federal practice, predictive 
coding is part of a global trend. For example, in February 2016, the High 
Court of England and Wales approved the use of predictive coding for the 
first time, highlighting its potential accuracy and efficiency benefits.101 Ven-
dors are even adapting predictive coding software to deal with logographic 
languages.102 
1. Growth of Electronically Stored Information 
The increased use of predictive coding is driven, in significant part, by 
the growth of ESI.103 More digital information has been created in just the 
past few years than existed in all human history before.104 The growth rate is 
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estimated at about forty percent per year.105 This means the amount of digital 
information is virtually doubling every two years.106 
By 2020, the amount of digital data in the world is expected to reach for-
ty-four zettabytes of data.107 To provide context for these numbers, this is 
more than six hundred times the amount of data in every published book in 
history.108 Perhaps less abstractly, each gigabyte (one trillionth of a zettabyte) 
could equal tens of thousands of printed pages.109 As Magistrate Judge Peck 
put it, “[t]he amount of digital information that is created everyday is stagger-
ing, and many companies preserve almost everything.” 110 
This dramatic increase in ESI has had a profound impact on civil dis-
covery practices. The sheer volume has obsoleted the traditional methods of 
discovery, which were effective for dealing with paper documents.111 Instead, 
new technological solutions—such as predictive coding—have been brought 
to the fore.112 
This growth in ESI has made discovery commensurately more expen-
sive.113 A 2012 study found that production costs on a per gigabyte basis av-
eraged around $18,000.114 Of particular relevance to a discussion of predic-
tive coding, review costs contributed 70% or more to the total amount in 
more than half of the cases.115 To do this review, client companies reported 
using attorneys whose rates ranged from $40 to $70 for temporary contract 
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attorneys and up to $300 for a higher-priced firm that might only do a second-
pass review.116 
As the surge in ESI has increased the costs of discovery, it has increased 
the opportunity for lawyers to strategically use discovery tactics as an exer-
cise of gamesmanship.117 And this development, in turn, contributes to the 
rising prevalence of predictive coding. 
2. Lawyers’ Gamesmanship 
In addition to directly encouraging the use of predictive coding, the 
growth in ESI has aggravated the issue of gamesmanship in civil discovery.118 
Although the extent to which abusive discovery practices are common is de-
bated,119 such conduct can contribute to costs and delays in litigation—two of 
the concerns that predictive coding is meant to address.120 
The original vision of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure was that discovery would be a self-regulating process.121 This vision 
depended on the assumption that a common interest in reciprocal courtesy 
would lead litigants and their attorneys to cooperate.122 And, with this under-
standing, the original 1938 Rules did not include many provisions for court 
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management of the discovery process, anticipating that it would only be re-
quired in very exceptional cases.123 
A number of factors, however, have made discovery more adversarial 
and, ultimately, costly than anticipated by the drafters of the original rules. 
For example, the general nature of litigation is adversarial with a consistent 
perception that client loyalty and combativeness are linked.124 And, as Profes-
sor Arthur Miller pithily explained, “The vision that adversarial tigers would 
behave like accommodating pussycats throughout the discovery period, sav-
ing their combative energies for trial, has not materialized.”125 To the contra-
ry, “[p]arties hotly contest discovery and pre-trial practice at least in part be-
cause everyone knows that reaching a jury depends on the success of fact-
gathering and procedural maneuvers.”126 Moreover, the processes for adjudi-
cating disputes and potential penalties also do not provide efficient disincen-
tives for bad behavior.127 This is exacerbated by judges’ general antipathy for 
policing such disputes.128 At the same time, the growth of the legal profession 
has decreased the likelihood of repeat interactions between lawyers, which 
reduces the game-theory incentives for cooperation.129 And this all happens in 
a world of increasingly large and complex federal cases.130 
The incentives for litigants skew towards seeking too much material be-
cause of the interaction of information asymmetries and cost placement—i.e., 
the requesting party does not know what a request will turn up and the burden 
for production falls on the producing party.131 Judges take an especially criti-
cal view of this practice, identifying as the chief form of discovery abuse.132 
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Additionally, litigants can use discovery requests to force settlement 
when a producing party’s costs of complying with its discovery obligations 
are greater than the requested relief.133 Illustrating these distorted incentives, 
“e-discovery trolls” have appeared.134 
The producing party might also engage in gamesmanship that results in 
over production. For example, a litigant might engage in a “data dump” in 
which it seeks to overwhelm the requesting party with material.135 Despite the 
general information asymmetries and financial elements of litigation, which 
mean the defendant is more frequently the party who has more discoverable 
material and resources,136 plaintiffs can also engage in this sort of discovery 
abuse.137 
Additionally, parties might engage in discovery that is designed to em-
barrass their opponents. For example, a party might pose personal, intrusive 
questions to their adversary.138 
Regardless of form,139 abusive discovery tactics lead to disputes, which 
make the litigation process more expensive for litigants.140 And the increase 
in costs is one of the main factors driving the adoption of predictive cod-
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ing.141 Moreover, court interventions bring in the issue of judicial legitima-
cy.142 
In response to the challenges raised by the increase in discoverable ma-
terial, lawyers’ gamesmanship, and the interaction between the two, there has 
been a procedural shift towards more judicial management as reflected in 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.143 
For example, in 1980, subdivision (f) was added to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26, entitling counsel to the assistance of the court in discovery 
planning.144 Three years later, judges were given additional powers to both 
proactively manage the discovery process and to sanction attorneys.145 In 
1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to introduce af-
firmative initial disclosures that must be made even without a formal discov-
ery request.146 And, in the same year, pre-discovery planning conferences also 
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were added.147 In 2000, both of these amendments were made uniform 
throughout the federal system.148 The 2000 amendments also modified the 
limits of discovery, absent a showing of good cause, from any matter “rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the action” to those “relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense.”149 In 2006, the term “electronically stored infor-
mation” was added to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to make clear that 
this sort of material was encompassed by the rules and that the courts would 
enforce this understanding.150 Most significantly for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, in 2015, a direct proportionality limitation to discovery was added to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.151 
3. Proportionality Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
In 2015, the definition of the scope of discovery permitted under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) was amended to require that the sought materi-
al be “proportional to the needs of the case.”152 Although the Advisory Com-
mittee notes to the rule disclaim any substantive change to the scope of dis-
covery, they acknowledge that the amendment is meant to bring the issue of 
costs more to the fore.153 This marks a move away from the previous domi-
nant discovery goal of comprehensiveness.154 Additionally, this has raised 
concerns that necessary discovery will be stifled in cases involving small-
value claims.155 Explaining these elements, some scholars have hypothesized 
that the effect of the proportionality amendment will be to focus the courts on 
costs and, perhaps, shift the burden to the requesting party.156 
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In response, many commentators—including judges, practitioners, and 
academics—have suggested that predictive coding might ameliorate that po-
tential harm.157 The relationship follows from predictive coding’s ability to 
reduce review costs.158 Additionally, the non-binary scoring component al-
lows parties to scale and stage their review and production.159 The upshot is 
that predictive coding can be a highly effective tool for enabling “the produc-
ing party to provide the requesting party with the most bang for the buck.”160 
4. Technological Innovation 
It is easy to forget how much technology has changed the world and the 
legal profession in a fairly short time.161 But the increased use of predictive 
coding in civil discovery naturally is also driven by the general advances in 
technology, which are altering how lawyers practice.162 This is part of a 
broader trend of similar developments such as the use of keyword searches 
and de-duplication.163 Decreased computing costs, which make the use of 
computer technology—including predictive coding—more economically ef-
ficient and spur uptake, contribute too.164 And the growth in use of predictive 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See, e.g., Theodore C. Hirt, The Quest for “Proportionality” in Electronic Discovery: 
Moving from Theory to Reality in Civil Litigation, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 171, 176–77 (2011) (not-
ing the Sedona Conference principles state, “[t]echnologies to reduce cost and burden should be 
considered in the proportionality analysis”); Losey, supra note 9, at 54–55; Peck, supra note 4, at 
3 (“While new technologies and ESI sources have added to the volume and cost of discovery, 
technology also offers solutions.”); Bay, supra note 9. 
 158 Losey, supra note 9, at 54 (“The use of the latest AI-based review technologies can signif-
icantly reduce these costs as shown, and for this reason alone predictive coding is the best tool we 
have for proportionality.”). 
 159 Id. at 55. 
 160 Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted). 
 161 See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, From Bricks and Mortar to Mega-Bytes and Mega-Pixels: The 
Changing Landscape of the Impact of Technology and Innovation on Urban Development, 42 
URB. LAW. 11, 11 (2011) (providing examples of technological advancement between 1963 and 
2010). 
 162 See Katz, supra note 68, at 909; John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Dis-
ruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal 
Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3045–46 (2014); Nasuti, supra note 5, at 223; The Sedona 
Conference Commentary on Information Governance, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 125 (2014). 
 163 Remus, supra note 10, at 1698. 
 164 See A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning 
from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1719; Brendan R. McDonald 
et al., The Attorney-Client Working Relationship: A Comparison of in-Person Versus Videocon-
ferencing Modalities, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200, 200 (2016); cf. S.J. Liebowitz & Ste-
phen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 283, 293 (1996) (cautioning that greater production and lower cost associated with techno-
logical innovation should not be mistaken for economies of scale in production). 
2018] Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice 847 
coding itself adds to economies of scale, improved service quality, and in-
creased user comfort.165 
C. Court Implementation of Predictive Coding in Civil Discovery 
1. Timeline of Significant Cases 
Having examined the structural factors driving the increasing use of 
predictive coding, this Article now turns to the existing case law. The section 
begins with a chronology of cases that contain more robust discussions of 
transparency and participation. It then synthesizes the holdings to identify the 
nascent doctrine.166 
In 2011, Magistrate Judge Peck of United States District Court of the 
Southern District of New York outlined the benefits of predictive coding in an 
article, implicitly inviting a court to approve its use in civil discovery.167 Sev-
eral months later, he accepted his own invitation.168 In Moore v. Publics 
Groupe, five female employees brought an employment discrimination suit 
against Publicis Groupe and its subsidiary, MSL Group, under federal and 
state statutes.169 The parties could not agree on how to use predictive coding 
to “‘cull down’ the approximately three million electronic documents” from 
the designated custodians.170 
In its order on the issue, the district court covered a number of issues 
that helped define the emerging doctrine. First, it rejected the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) prohibited the defendants’ 
from certifying that the production as “complete” if it was not definitively 
exhaustive, noting that the subsection incorporates a proportionality require-
ment.171 Second, the district court held that neither Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 nor the Daubert expert-qualification framework applied to discovery 
search methods, limiting those procedural protections to evidence submitted 
to a jury at trial.172 Third, the district court deferred ruling on the plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Mitchell London, Resolving the Civil Litigant’s Discovery Dilemma, 26 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 837, 856 (2013) (suggesting that as more courts facilitate the use of TAR, costs will 
decrease as quality increases). 
 166 For other predictive coding case chronologies, see Julia L. Brickell & Peter J. Pizzi, To-
wards a Synthesis of Judicial Perspectives on Technology-Assisted Review, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 
309, 313–19 (2015); Paul E. Burns & Mindy M. Morton, Technology-Assisted Review: The Judi-
cial Pioneers, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 35, passim (2014). 
 167 Andrew Peck, Search, Forward, LEGAL TECH. NEWS (Oct. 1 2011), https://www.law.com/
legaltechnews/almID/1202516530534/Search-Forward/ [https://perma.cc/NT5Q-VRJ7].  
 168 Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 182–83. 
 169 Id. at 183. 
 170 Id. at 184. 
 171 Id. at 188. 
 172 Id. at 188–89. 
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objection that the defendants’ methods did not provide confidence that the 
results would be accurate, opting to wait until more information was available 
about the actual results.173 
The district court in Moore then offered “further analysis and lessons for 
the future” on issues that were not directly raised by the parties’ dispute.174 
Starting with the proposition that the objective of e-discovery is “identify as 
many relevant documents as possible, while reviewing as few non-relevant 
documents as possible,” the court discussed predictive coding’s relative accu-
racy, finding that it performed better—and at lower relative costs—than alter-
native methods such as keyword searches.175 It also stated that the defendants’ 
willingness to share the full seed set—including all non-privileged documents 
regardless as to whether they were coded relevant—to the plaintiffs contrib-
uted to the court’s approval of the process because it allayed concerns about 
the potential black-box aspect of the technology.176 Additionally, the district 
court discussed the benefits of staging discovery.177 Finally, it noted that the 
parties’ e-discovery vendors attended and participated in the hearings, which 
assisted the decision by providing additional technical insight into the pro-
cess.178 
In the following months, several other courts dealt with predictive cod-
ing issues in orders.179 Of particular relevance, in In re Actos (Pioglitazone) 
Products Liability Litigation, the district court judge approved the parties’ 
agreement to use predictive coding where the plaintiffs were provided with 
technical training for the predictive coding software and the parties worked 
together to code the seed sets.180 
In 2013, in Gordon v. Kaleida Health, the district court examined the 
roles of experts in predictive coding, distinguishing between ministerial and 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Id. at 189. 
 174 Id. at 189–93. 
 175 Id. at 189–92. 
 176 Id. at 192. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 193. 
 179 E.g., Kleen, 2012 WL 4498465, at *5 (describing how the court guided the parties towards 
a compromise where the plaintiffs had sought to compel the defendants to redo discovery searches 
using predictive coding instead of keyword searches because their experts disagreed on the accu-
racy of the techniques); EORHB, 2013 WL 1960621, at *1 (withdrawing its October 2012 sua 
sponte order that the parties use predictive coding—and the same vendor—after the parties agreed 
that the cost was too high given the number of documents); Glob. Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Avia-
tion, No. CL 61040, 2012 WL 1431215, at *1–2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (permitting, for the 
first time, a defendant to use predictive coding over the objections of the plaintiff).  
 180 Actos, 2012 WL 7861249, at *4. 
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advisory functions.181 The court also noted the importance of party coopera-
tion.182 
In 2014, other courts more directly addressed how cooperation and 
transparency impact their decisions. For example, in Bridgestone Americas, 
Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., the district court permitted the 
plaintiff to use predictive coding because the full seed set was offered to the 
defendant, which had technical expertise with “big data.”183 Likewise, in 
2014 in Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Delaney, the district court re-
jected a party’s unilateral use of predictive coding because it violated an ear-
lier court-approved agreement and the protocols did not provide the appropri-
ate levels of cooperation and transparency.184 
Continuing this discussion (albeit coming out in the opposite direction), 
in In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation, the 
district court determined that the non-responsiveness documents from the 
seed set fell outside of the scope of discovery because, by their defining char-
acteristic, they were not responsive.185 Even still, the Biomet court urged Bi-
omet to rethink its refusal.186 
In 2014, in Dynamo Holdings Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner, the tax 
court approved the petitioners’ request to predictive coding, in part, because 
they promised to retain e-discovery experts to meet with the respondent’s 
counsel or his experts.187 On the other hand, the Dynamo court also articulat-
ed a view that judges typically should leave the manner of review to the re-
sponding party unless the requesting party was able to show a deficiency.188 
This implies a limited role for courts to manage discovery for the participa-
tion norm. 
In early 2015, Magistrate Judge Peck returned with a second major order 
involving predictive coding.189 In Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., the district court 
asserted, “[T]he case law has developed to the point that it is now black letter 
law that where the producing party wants to utilize TAR for document review, 
courts will permit it.”190 But the district court acknowledged that the required 
level of transparency and cooperation with respect to the training sets re-
                                                                                                                           
 181 Gordon, 2013 WL 2250506, passim. 
 182 Id. at *18. 
 183 Bridgestone, 2014 WL 4923014, at *1. 
 184 Delaney, 2014 WL 3563467, at *9, *11. 
 185 In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-MD-2391, 2013 WL 
6405156, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2013); see also Aurora, 2015 WL 10550240, at *2. 
 186 Id. at *18. 
 187 Dynamo, 143 T.C. at 192. 
 188 Id. at 188–89. 
 189 Rio Tinto, 306 F.R.D. at 125. 
 190 Id. at 127. 
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mained an open question.191 And the district court ultimately concluded that 
other methods—such as statistical estimations—could validate the results and 
obviate the need for greater process transparency.192 
2. Lessons Drawn from the Case Law 
The seminal case on predictive coding, Moore, set out the basic ele-
ments of the emerging doctrine. The central inquiry primarily focuses on pro-
portionality.193 It evaluates the “appropriateness” of predictive coding in an 
individual case by balancing its accuracy against its costs to determine its 
value relative to other review methods.194 
The superintendence of the productions has also come out in the case 
law. For example, courts also have considered the efficiency of staging pre-
dictive coding review and production, trending against setting predetermined 
raw numerical goals.195 Additionally, courts have shown concern about ac-
countability regarding the end production, with some courts promoting coop-
erative transparency and others permitting statistical estimation or other vali-
dation methods.196 Still, courts have shown a fair amount of the deference 
that is traditionally given to the choices of the producing party.197 
Courts also have considered how predictive coding fits within the exist-
ing evidentiary and professional responsibility obligations. To the former, the 
application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or Daubert to the expert testi-
mony that is often necessary to evaluate the proposed protocols has been con-
sidered.198 To the latter, courts are mindful of issues such as the protection of 
                                                                                                                           
 191 Id. at 128. 
 192 Id. at 128–29. 
 193 Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 191. 
 194 E.g., Donziger, 2013 WL 1087236, at *32; Kleen, 2012 WL 4498465, at *5; Moore, 287 
F.R.D. at 191–92. 
 195 Compare Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 185, 192 (implementing staging by record custodian, be-
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 196 E.g., Rio Tinto, 306 F.R.D. at 128–29; Gordon, 2013 WL 2250506, at *18; Moore, 287 
F.R.D. at 182–83. 
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3563467, at *9, *11 (compelling ESI production, but permitting parties’ latitude to determine 
method of production); EORHB, 2013 WL 1960621, at *1 (allowing parties to forego predictive 
coding where litigants agreed predictive coding was prohibitively costly); Landow, 2012 WL 
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 198 E.g., Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 189. 
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attorney-work-product and the potential tension between cooperation and 
zealous advocacy.199 
Finally, a trend has been for predictive coding to be used in cases involv-
ing relatively sophisticated parties in high-stakes litigation. For example, the 
plaintiffs in Moore sought damages “in excess of $100 million.”200 Other ma-
jor cases also involved class actions or multidistrict litigation. 201 
III. EXAMINING THE TRADE-OFFS 
When considering whether to order the use of predictive coding in civil 
discovery, courts weigh the costs and benefits. In these Mathews-style as-
sessments, courts have focused on pragmatic implementation issues such as 
the relative efficacy and efficiency of predictive coding processes. But this 
emerging jurisprudence fails to include the stress that the opacity of predic-
tive coding processes can place on the norm of knowledgeable participation 
by parties without significant resources. 
This Part starts by describing the existing debates about the use of pre-
dictive coding in civil discovery that appear in the case law and academic 
literature. It then surfaces and analyzes the under-examined normative trade-
off between accuracy and cost-efficiency on the one hand and participation on 
the other that is latent in the emerging doctrine. 
A. Accuracy and Economic Efficiency Considerations 
Most evaluations of predictive coding include some discussion of the 
baseline practical aspects of discovery in civil litigation.202 In 2013 in Moore 
v. Publicis Groupe, Magistrate Judge Peck explained, “The goal is for the 
review method to result in higher recall and higher precision than another 
review method, at a cost proportionate to the ‘value’ of the case.”203 
Embedded within Magistrate Judge Peck’s statement are the twin con-
cerns of discovery’s general proportionality inquiry: accuracy and cost-
efficiency. These are two of the three principle concepts of procedural jus-
tice. 204 Thus, it is necessary but not sufficient that these instrumentalist norms 
                                                                                                                           
 199 E.g., Kleen, 2012 WL 4498465, at *1, *19. 
 200 Amended Class Action Complaint at 63, Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, 287 F.R.D. 182 
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Actos, 2012 WL 7861249. 
 202 See, e.g., Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 189–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Nasuti, 
supra note 5, at 241. 
 203 Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 190. 
 204 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (describing tenets of procedural justice). 
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are present in the jurisprudence, even as courts and scholars still wrestle with 
their practical components, as described below. 
1. Accuracy 
Virtually every order on predictive coding discusses its ability to ensure 
a reasonably complete and accurate production.205 And, as Magistrate Judge 
Peck’s statement in the introduction to this subsection illustrates, measures of 
predictive coding’s efficacy have largely focused on their recall and preci-
sion.206 In this context, “recall” is the percentage of documents that are identi-
fied as relevant by a predictive coding search process.207 “Precision” is the 
fraction of the recall pool of documents that actually are relevant.208 
But these measures should not be treated as the ends themselves.209 In-
stead, the goal is about ensuring a reasonably complete production.210 And 
scores for relevance are not the same as measurements of importance.211 For 
example, a unique document might score poorly for potential relevance (be-
cause there are no good comparators from the seed set) but be very important 
because of its particular content.212 
Even the superior recall and precision of predictive coding is subject to 
debate. Many scholars and academics take the view that manual review is no 
longer the “gold standard.”213 Two studies published in 2010 helped drive this 
view.214 These studies showed that predictive coding’s recall and precision 
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 214 Remus, supra note 10, at 1702–03 (discussing the Grossman & Cormack study, supra note 
20, and a study by Herbert Roitblat, infra note 215). 
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could exceed that of manual review.215 But even these studies contained ca-
veats. For example, one study warned that the variability of human judgment 
made it difficult to find a baseline from which to assess the relevance deter-
minations.216 And others have argued that more research is required.217 Illu-
minating the validity of the latter point, a Sedona Conference Working Group 
in 2016 still cited to studies that are older than five years, which is a fairly 
significant period of time given the rate of technological change.218 
Additionally, the recall and precision of any given predictive coding 
process will hinge on input variations. For example, predictive coding can 
struggle with certain types of electronic files, such as spreadsheets or 
graphics.219 And any mistakes in the initial coding can taint the model train-
ing—and, thus, the final results—unless it is caught and corrected.220 
Another disputed input issue is whether the initial training set is selected 
through either random or judgmental sampling.221 With the former, the selec-
tion draws randomly form the total population.222 For the latter, a subject-
matter expert selects previously identified documents that are good exemplars 
of important categories.223 The downside to random sampling is that it re-
quires a larger sample set or longer time to train the system because the num-
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ber of relevant documents will likely be lower.224 On the other hand, judg-
mental sampling can introduce skew based on the subject-matter expert’s se-
lection of the documents.225 
An additional set of unsettled implementation questions goes to quality 
control. At the front end, this includes the setting of confidence levels, confi-
dence intervals, and prediction score thresholds.226 The first two measures go 
to the likelihood that the sample is representative.227 The third describes the 
cutoff score for determining whether material is deemed responsive.228 Dur-
ing the processes, quality can be verified through sampling.229 And, post-
coding, lawyers might manually review the responsive documents or use sta-
tistical validation techniques to confirm the reasonable completeness of the 
production.230 Although there has been limited academic or judicial debate 
about these issues,231 litigants have contested the appropriate levels for the 
various measures, the extent to which sampling is necessary, and the need for 
post-coding validation of the results.232 
2. Cost Efficiency 
In addition to examining whether predictive coding processes are accu-
rate, courts and scholars have looked at its cost efficiency.233 And scholars 
have gone further, discussing how efficiency should be normatively defined 
and to whom its benefits should accrue. 
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Efficiency has primarily been defined by its ability to deliver a higher 
number of relevant documents at lower monetary cost than other methods.234 
Some scholars have questioned whether the potential losses in comprehen-
siveness are problematic, even while acknowledging the necessity of address-
ing proportionality concerns.235 
This emphasis on costs can be hard to concretely evaluate because ven-
dors are reluctant to publicly disclose their pricing.236 But there is widespread 
agreement that even expensive predictive coding processes can reduce dis-
covery costs for cases involving large amounts of text-based electronic doc-
uments because of the low incremental costs of applying the process to each 
additional document.237 This, however, is not undisputed, with some arguing 
that predictive coding is appropriate in smaller cases and some arguing that it 
can be fiscally inefficient even in larger cases.238 Also, discovery disputes 
likely are more expensive when they involve experts.239 
Even assuming that predictive coding provides more accurate and com-
prehensive results at a lower cost, it is not settled how the gains should be 
distributed between the parties.240 A court might allocate the benefit to the 
requesting party, increasing the amount of material that must be produced.241 
Alternatively, the court might permit the requesting party to produce only as 
much it would have under conventional methods and saving further ex-
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pense.242 The ability to scale and stage review has also led to innovative cost-
shifting and cost-sharing proposals.243 
The courts’ focus on cost efficiency also comes under fire as a normative 
matter. Professor Brooke Coleman provides a comprehensive and forceful 
critique of the narrow way in which efficiency has been defined in civil pro-
cedure.244 Professor Coleman explains how the incomplete understanding of 
efficiency excludes vitally important, but difficult to measure, non-pecuniary 
costs such as the filtering of meritorious claims.245 She also notes that the 
predominance of cost sensitivity has led towards non-trial adjudications and 
plaintiff skepticism by the courts.246 This voice joins the chorus of scholars 
and legal authorities who also have challenged the sole focus on costs, noting 
its problematic limits on other important norms.247 And some of this criticism 
has noted how proportionality—that is, the primary mechanism of the con-
ventional efficiency norm—can become a deregulatory tool that especially 
harms plaintiffs with small-value claims.248 Finally, the empirical basis for the 
focus on costs also is questionable, undermining its putative basis.249 
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tion, clichés that have been thrown out by the defense bar that sadly in my judgment have been 
picked up in judicial opinions without any empiric demonstration whatsoever.”). 
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B. Expert Reliability and Professional Responsibility Implications 
The increased use of predictive coding also has raised new questions 
about the role of experts and certain professional responsibilities in civil dis-
covery. These concerns seem to arise after the courts and parties have satis-
fied their concerns, at least to some extent, with the accuracy and cost effi-
ciency of the processes. 
1. Expert Evidentiary Issues 
In Moore, the plaintiffs argued that the procedural protections of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702250 and the Daubert framework251 applied to the expert 
testimony offered in support of the predictive coding processes.252 This ech-
oed the concerns raised by the district court in United States v. O’Keefe, 
which had reasoned that the technical issues implicated by the discovery pro-
cesses were beyond a layperson’s understanding and, thus, required reassur-
ances as to their reliability.253 But the Moore district court rejected the plain-
tiffs’ arguments, interpreting the procedural protections as only applying to 
evidence offered to a jury.254 
Although it is unclear whether any courts have or will heed their advice, 
the majority of commentators express doubt about the Moore decision on the 
applicability of the expert-reliability protections.255 Some scholars have chal-
lenged the statutory interpretation, noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
is silent as to whether it is limited to trial and questioning how much weight 
                                                                                                                           
 250 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits a witness to present expert opinion testimony if: 
“(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient 
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert 
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 251 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court interpreted Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 and concluded that the “trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). The 
Court then outlined factors that trial judges are to consider in making this assessment. Id. at 593–
94. 
 252 Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 188. 
 253 United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Given this complexity, 
for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to 
produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread. This 
topic is clearly beyond the ken of a layman and requires that any such conclusion be based on 
evidence that, for example, meets the criteria of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); see 
also Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 260 n.10 (D. Md. 2008); Equity 
Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 254 Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 188–89. 
 255 Gelb, supra note 13, at 1293–97; Waxse & Yoakum-Kriz, supra note 13, at 219–21. 
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the term “help the trier of fact” can bear.256 Additionally, the skeptics argue 
that, with the growth in ESI, the importance of discovery and its management 
has grown because of the potential case development and cost issues.257 The 
protections also help educate the courts and inspire more confidence in their 
ability to evaluate the reliability of the testimony.258 These commentators fur-
ther contend that the costs of the expert-reliability protections would not nec-
essarily be a significant burden because the specter will encourage coopera-
tion, the utilization of the technology will offset some of the dispute costs, 
and judges can sequence hearings while scaling productions.259 Finally, these 
protections might be necessary in that some experts have suggested that some 
protocols would not survive a Daubert challenge, which speaks to their po-
tential lack of reliability.260 
On the other hand, Professor Dana Remus offered some thoughtful in-
sights in support of forgoing the use of Daubert hearings.261 She argued that 
vendors would end up testifying about their own products because of the lack 
of broader comparative data on the technologies.262 Professor Remus also 
raised the concern that applying Daubert would entrench predictive coding in 
the realm of technology experts, not lawyers.263 
At a normative level, these concerns about the reliability of expert testi-
mony primarily seem to go to the issue of accuracy. But, regardless as to 
whether Daubert applies, this dialogue in the jurisprudence also, at minimum, 
gestures towards the importance of explanations. 
2. Professional Responsibility Implications 
A new technology like predictive coding can introduce wrinkles to vir-
tually all of the myriad discovery practices an attorney might undertake when 
dealing with ESI.264 This subsection discusses the four professional responsi-
bility implications that have already come to the fore. 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Gelb, supra note 13, at 1293; Waxse & Yoakum-Kriz, supra note 13, at 219–21; Panel 
Discussion, Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1163, 
1237 (2014) [hereinafter Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence]. 
 257 Gelb, supra note 13, at 1296–97. 
 258 Waxse & Yoakum-Kriz, supra note 13, at 220. 
 259 Id.; Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, supra note 256, at 1239–40. 
 260 Nelson & Simek, supra note 64, at 24. 
 261 E.g., Remus, supra note 10, at 1712. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
 264 See John M. Barkett, More on the Ethics of E-Discovery: Predictive Coding and Other Forms 
of Computer-Assisted Review 42 (2012) (on file with Duke University School of Law) https://
law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/TAR_conference/Panel_5-Original_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2927-X9PD] (providing thoughtful commentary on a host of extant and potential 
 
2018] Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice 859 
First, the predictive coding doctrine largely privileges cooperation.265 
The potential tension between cooperation and zealous representation was 
recognized and addressed early in the case law.266 In 2012, in Kleen Products 
LLC v. Packaging Corp. of America, Magistrate Judge Nolan began by quot-
ing the Sedona Conference Cooperation proclamation: 
Lawyers have twin duties of loyalty: While they are retained to be 
zealous advocates for their clients, they bear a professional obliga-
tion to conduct discovery in a diligent and candid manner. Their 
combined duty is to strive in the best interests of their clients to 
achieve the best results at a reasonable cost, with integrity and can-
dor as officers of the court. Cooperation does not conflict with the 
advancement of their clients’ interests—it enhances it. Only when 
lawyers confuse advocacy with adversarial conduct are these twin 
duties in conflict.267 
Along these same lines, the district court in Martinelli v. Johnson & Johnson 
approved an order in which the parties agreed “that their counsel’s zealous 
representation of them is not compromised by conducting discovery in a co-
operative manner.”268 And, in its explanation for taking the same position, the 
Seventh Circuit Committee’s pilot program on electronic discovery explained 
that a failure to cooperate could lead to increased litigation costs.269 Once 
again though, Professor Remus offers a reminder to undertake a critical as-
sessment, noting that the move towards cooperation is happening at the same 
time the goal of comprehensiveness is losing its primacy, leading to a poten-
tial break with the adversary system that is designed to protect clients and 
lead to just results.270 
The particular form of cooperation urged by the courts271—that is, shar-
ing the seed sets—also has raised concerns about the protection of attorney-
                                                                                                                           
issues, including whether Model Rule 3.4(a), which prohibits an attorney from obstructing an oppo-
nent’s access to information, could be used to require the use of predictive coding). 
 265 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 266 See Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012).  
 267 Id. (quoting The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331, 
331 (2009) (emphasis omitted)); see also Morgan, supra note 12, at 71. 
 268 Martinelli v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:15-cv-01733-MCE-EFB, 2016 WL 1458109, at *1 
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016). 
 269 SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM, INTERIM REPORT ON PHASE 
THREE 6 (2013), http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/phase_three_interim_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9AE-KCHE]. 
 270 Remus, supra note 10, at 1717–18. 
 271 E.g., Kleen, 2012 WL 4498465, at *5; Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 192. 
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work-product.272 The concerns are that the seed set might divulge the mental 
impressions of the attorney.273 Additionally, some of the non-responsive doc-
uments might have information that reveals embarrassing or even incriminat-
ing conduct that is unrelated to the instant case.274 Some courts and scholars 
have suggested that such concerns are lessened when the seed set is randomly 
selected, the coding is not included, or a continuous active process is used.275 
In its application, although not entirely uniform, courts generally have not 
found that discovery on technologically complex discovery processes impli-
cates attorney-work-product.276 
Second, the rapid technological changes associated with predictive cod-
ing also raise the issue of competence. A comment to the American Bar Asso-
ciation Model Rule of Professional Conduct on competence only demands 
that a lawyer to have an understanding of “the benefits and risks associated 
with relevant technology.”277 Likewise, the model rule on a lawyer’s respon-
sibility regarding non-lawyer assistance creates a low bar, requiring only that 
the lawyer remain aware of how the non-lawyer services are being per-
formed.278 But there is a common understanding that lawyers will have to 
develop greater technical expertise—from better understanding the technolo-
gy to enhancing their statistical knowledge—to competently serve their cli-
ent.279 And, in the meantime, there might be an element of caution that has 
inhibited more rapid adoption of predictive coding.280 In partial explanation, 
                                                                                                                           
 272 E.g., Facciola & Favro, supra note 14, passim; Remus, supra note 10, at 1716–17. 
 273 E.g., Facciola & Favro, supra note 14, passim; Remus, supra note 10, at 1716–17. 
 274 E.g., Facciola & Favro, supra note 14, passim; Remus, supra note 10, at 1716–17. 
 275 Rio Tinto, 306 F.R.D. at 128; Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 12, at 644–45. 
 276 See, e.g., FormFactor, Inc v. Micro-Probe, Inc., No. C-10-03095 PJH (JCS), 2012 WL 
1575093, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (ordering discovery on search terms); Romero v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109–10 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (ordering discovery on search terms); cf. Miller v. 
Holzmann, 238 F.R.D. 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting the limits of the decision in Sporck v. Peil, 
759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985)). But see Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Hunt Control Sys., Inc., Civil 
Action No. 11-3684 DMC, 2014 WL 1494517, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2014) (granting a protective 
order to prevent a deposition about the producing party’s discovery processes related to its produc-
tion of its ESI because it would open the door to more discovery with no limiting principle). 
 277 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 278 Remus, supra note 10, at 1710 (discussing Model Rule 5.3 and its comments). 
 279 Joy Flowers Conti & Richard N. Lettieri, E-Discovery Ethics: Emerging Standards of 
Technological Competence, FED. LAW., Oct.–Nov. 2015, passim (2015); Randy L. Dryer, Litiga-
tion, Technology & Ethics: Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks or Legal Luddites Are No Longer 
Welcome in Utah, UTAH B.J., May–June 2015, at 12, 16; Darla W. Jackson, Lawyers Can’t Be 
Luddites Anymore: Do Law Librarians Have a Role in Helping Lawyers Adjust to the New Ethics 
Rules Involving Technology?, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 395, 398 (2013); Remus, supra note 10, at 1719; 
Vaccaro, supra note 212, at 319 (“Experts say lawyers must be prepared to use a quantitative 
approach and should also have an understanding of statistics.”). Various methods for doing so 
include revamping law school curriculum. See Katz, supra note 68, at 965. 
 280 See Metzler, supra note 141, at 1164. 
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Rule 26(g) requires that lawyers certify their results, which implies that the 
lawyers will develop the appropriate competence before using the new tech-
nologies—that is, their use will be knowledgeable.281 
In addition to flagging the changing set of competencies, some commen-
tators have asked whether the use of predictive coding might negatively im-
pact traditional areas of attorney competence. For example, one large law 
firm partner asked, “More often than not, you’re trying to learn your case 
through the documents, and how will we substitute that function of learning 
from the documents when you’re using predictive coding?”282 Although pre-
dictive coding protocols do not eliminate human reviewers completely (if 
only for the coding of the training sets), the point remains that the potential 
efficiency gain might have an unintended downside. 
Third, related to the issue of technical competence, some commentators 
have questioned whether the use of predictive coding might veer towards the 
unauthorized practice of law.283 Given its technical complexity, predictive 
coding generally will require the involvement of non-lawyer technicians who 
might have a primary role in the process.284 But the concerns about unauthor-
ized practice of law might be mitigated because predictive coding primarily 
operates as a tool of the attorney, not the client.285 And, in this way, the pro-
cesses might resemble the outsourcing of document review, which is not un-
authorized practice of law so long as licensed attorneys oversee it.286 If an 
attorney lacks the technical expertise to understand the predictive coding pro-
cesses, however, the attorney will not be able to adequately superintend the 
review.287 One additional challenge is that courts’ analyses have often em-
ployed analogies to human tasks, which does not always appreciate the 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See generally Peter Segrist, How the Rise of Big Data and Predictive Analytics Are 
Changing the Attorney’s Duty of Competence, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 527, 603 (2015). 
 282 Joe Palazzolo, Software: The Attorney Who Is Always on the Job, WALL ST. J., May 6, 
2013, at B1; see also Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 26, 45 (2015), https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/06/Final-ALL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3J4-JZE9]. 
 283 E.g., Remus, supra note 10, at 1709–11. 
 284 See John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to 
Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 3001 (2014) (discussing the expansion of legal 
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about the strength of the client-protection interest that animates much of the unauthorized practice 
of law jurisprudence. Id.; see also Remus & Levy, supra note 14, at 538–42; Deborah L. Rhode & 
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Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2595 (2014). 
 286 Remus, supra note 10, at 1709. 
 287 Id.; see also Matt Hassett et al., Managing Outsourcing and E-Discovery, COUNSEL, Feb. 
2014, at 15, 17. 
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unique elements of the technology.288 The final complication that arises 
around the potential unauthorized practice of law is when (or whether) even 
human document review consists of the practice of law.289 
One last issue—the inadvertent production of protected material—
brings together the concerns about cooperation, protection of attorney-work-
product, and competence. Given the volume of ESI, perfect review for mate-
rial protected under either the attorney-client privilege or attorney-work-
product doctrine is unrealistic. Commentators, however, differ as to the likeli-
hoods that courts would find either that the privilege was waived by using an 
outside vendor or that the attorney failed to take reasonable steps to prevent 
disclosure by using the technology.290 And while Federal Rule of Evidence 
502 was designed to address these concerns and encourage the use of review 
technology, inadvertent disclosure still means that an opposing party has seen 
material it should not have.291 
While these discussions are important to the development of the doctrine 
and the regulation of the profession, the larger question—and the focus of this 
Article—is not about lawyers’ formal compliance with their basic profession-
al responsibility obligations in a new context but, instead, about the consider-
ation of legal norms that should inform how all litigation players—from par-
ties to lawyers to judges—approach how opaque technologies are used in civ-
il discovery. And, so far, the jurisprudence and scholarship has not placed an 
emphasis on the role that explanations play in serving the participation norm. 
C. Under-Examined Normative Trade-Off Between Economic  
Efficiency and Participation 
1. Defects of the Existing Approach 
The significant, under-examined aspect of predictive coding in civil dis-
covery is the trade-off between accuracy and cost-efficiency on one hand and 
the norm of participation on the other, particularly as it would apply to liti-
                                                                                                                           
 288 Remus & Levy, supra note 14, at 540–41. 
 289 Id.; James A. Sherer et al., Merger and Acquisition Due Diligence Part II–The Devil in the 
Details, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 4, 17 (2016); see also Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom LLP, No. 14-3845-cv, 2015 WL 4476828, at *2 (2d Cir. July 23, 2015). 
 290 Compare Murphy, supra note 217, at 645–46 (discussing the reasonability of computer-
based analytic methods), and Remus, supra note 10, at 1722 (suggesting the utility of claw-back 
agreements in cases involving predictive coding), with Vaccaro, supra note 212, at 322–23 (sug-
gesting courts may not allow claw-back of privileged documents absent a showing of reasonable 
precautions to prevent disclosure, and recommending the use of a privilege log). 
 291 See FED. R. EVID. 502; Murphy, supra note 217, at 646; Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses 
Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1669, 1670–73 (2013). 
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gants without significant financial resources. As described in Part II, these are 
the primary elements of modern procedural justice.292 Courts and scholars 
have primarily focused only on the accuracy and cost efficiency aspects.293 
But the larger issue of the jurisprudence’s comportment with procedural jus-
tice norms is not as significantly implicated by these two norms because both 
can be confirmed through statistical validation, obviating the concerns about 
predictive coding’s intelligibility.294 In contrast, the participation norm hinges 
on explanations, starkly illuminating the intelligibility challenge of predictive 
coding.295 
The participation norm, however, has not been entirely overlooked. For 
example, Professor Remus questioned how poorer litigants would be able to 
challenge predictive coding processes and argued that lawyers have an ethical 
duty to ensure that such parties have access to the technology.296 And, at a 
more general level, some of the push to encourage transparency and coopera-
tion about search protocols can be understood as an attempt to mitigate the 
potential “black-box” quality of predictive coding for the less sophisticated 
litigant.297 But, other than these gestures to the issue, the trade-off has neither 
been prioritized nor been explicitly discussed as a normative compromise. 
Instead, accuracy and cost efficiency have largely been assumed to be the 
predominant norms at play.298 
The normative trade-off warrants more discussion because, although not 
directly discussed, it is present—if latent—in the burgeoning doctrine. 
To be sure, courts frequently “muddle through” new or complicated le-
gal questions.299 But a failure to acknowledge underlying sub silentio judg-
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ments results in future parties (and courts) lacking appropriately clear and 
coherent guidance.300 
The participation norm—and its implication for the judicial management 
of discovery—is also reflected in the broader case law.301 For example, in a 
decision that resolved a dispute over a protective order, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated: 
This public interest is reinforced by the value we place on the right 
of every litigant to participate in the process whereby justice is 
done—to understand and become involved in the proceeding, not 
to be compelled passively to await its outcome. Regardless of 
whether these considerations are deemed to be inherent in the prin-
ciple of due process, they must be accorded considerable weight by 
a trial judge when considering the propriety of issuing a protective 
order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).302 
Earlier, this Article rhetorically asked whether a discovery review pro-
cess provides for intelligible explanations of its choices beyond a showing 
that the process resulted in a reasonably accurate and complete production.303 
This notion is contested—particularly by practitioners—because it raises 
pragmatic concerns about both the protection of attorney-work-product and 
costs.304 But recall that courts already are generally permitting discovery on 
discovery when the requests go to understanding the production processes.305 
And, in keeping with this judicial practice, an empirical study has shown that 
attorneys generally do not favor privileging only speed and expense.306 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are instances 
                                                                                                                           
 300 Fowler, supra note 299, at 155. 
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 302 Doe v. District of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115, 1119–20 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Remus, 
supra note 10, at 1691. 
 303 See supra notes 202–249 and accompanying text. 
 304 See also Solum, supra note 42, at 242. Compare Remus, supra note 10, at 1717 (discuss-
ing the tension between production comprehensiveness and nonproduction of irrelevant or privi-
leged documents), with Facciola & Favro, supra note 14, at 32 (suggesting courts are unlikely to 
accept an argument that seed sets may be withheld as attorney-work-product). Some scholars have 
pushed this challenge to the general assumptions about discovery even further, arguing that dis-
covery should be understood as having a judicially-recognizable social information-sharing bene-
fit that extends beyond the particular litigants’ instrumentalist ends. See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, 
The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1689 (2016). 
 305 See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
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when the participation element of the procedural due process requires expla-
nations—implicitly elevating this aspect of the participation norm to a consti-
tutional principle.307 
Furthermore, this Article’s ultimate recommendation is not that courts 
must privilege participation—as it flows from intelligibility—above all else. 
Rather, the claim is only that courts should acknowledge the new role of 
opaque algorithms and the stress that might place on the participation 
norm.308 And a closer look at the norm’s dignity, satisfaction, and legitimacy 
components illuminates the grounding of this call for intelligibility.309 
The dignity aspect of the participation norm “is grounded in the social 
contract implicit in American constitutional democracy, whereby govern-
ment agrees to treat its citizens with dignity and respect.”310 In the context 
of legal process, this means litigants are entitled to processes that enable them 
to comprehend what is happening and, armed with this understanding, make a 
case that the decisionmaker treats seriously.311 In other words, the dignity 
aspect of the participation norm has subcomponents—understanding, voice, 
and intelligibility—that extend beyond mere accuracy of outcome.312 But 
how can a less sophisticated litigant be treated with this sort of dignity if the 
party cannot afford an expert and is facing complex technology whose pro-
cesses are not tied to the substance of the case? From this flows the premise 
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that a litigant may ask another to explain an opaque technology that is being 
used within a judicially managed process.313 
The satisfaction element of the participation norm explains the value of 
those dignity concerns. A number of studies confirm the relationship between 
a perception of procedural fairness—with the features described above—and 
satisfaction with the legal decision.314 This is so even when the process might 
be less accurate or more expensive than one that permitted less participa-
tion.315 And the sense that justice has been done that follows from the ability 
to participate is a fundamental aspect of popular government.316 
This Article’s claim that litigants have a legitimate interest in intelligible 
explanations is further buttressed by the increased managerial role of the 
courts in the discovery process.317 Discovery issues can effectively decide 
cases.318 Reasoned decision making tied to the substantive legal issues in a 
case is the essence of procedurally just judicial action.319 This sort of articula-
tion reassures parties that their arguments have been heard and understood.320 
And this serves both the dignity and satisfaction elements, as well as going to 
a more fundamental conception of political legitimacy that posits a right to 
meaningfully engage with adjudicative processes that may be binding.321 
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Solicitude for the norm of participation matters even more for litigants 
without financial resources.322 When discovery is stifled, parties might feel 
disempowered and this feeling of injustice is likely to be enhanced when a 
plaintiff is facing a defendant who has the more resources such that he or she 
is able to muster all the necessary facts and arguments without affirmative 
court interventions.323 This dynamic is aggravated by predictive coding be-
cause poorer litigants probably will not understand the technology and will 
not have the resources to hire experts, leaving them unable to effectively con-
test the approaches chosen by their richer adversaries.324 In this context, this 
barrier to equitable, knowledgeable participation is a function of the general 
opacity of predictive coding processes that results from the technological 
compromise between interpretability and efficacy.325 But this is not just a nat-
ural state that must be accepted; rather, the judiciary has a role to play in 
managing the impact of the wealth disparities and their ostensibly neutral 
choices about procedural norms can ultimately determine who benefits.326 
On the other hand, the use of predictive coding in civil discovery does 
not cut in just one direction—even as to the participation norm. Militating for 
its use, there are several ways in which predictive coding can improve the 
opportunities for meaningful participation by parties with fewer financial re-
sources. For example, the iterative and content-removed nature of most pre-
dictive coding processes removes the asymmetric-information issues that oth-
erwise follow from charging the requesting party to generate key words.327 
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Instead, the requesting party gets the benefit of scalable access to the full uni-
verse of documents. And, although the feature weights used by the algorithms 
are not necessarily causatively related to the underlying legal issue in the liti-
gation, the human judgments applied to the training sets presumably are. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the procedural legitimacy issues discussed above, 
as a descriptive matter, it is certainly possible that correlations can provide 
insights even without being able to engage in the substance.328 Additionally, 
the attenuated mechanical nature potentially reduces the opportunities for 
intentionally intrusive requests.329 The dual-edged nature of predictive coding 
further supports including an assessment of its impact on the norm of partici-
pation in the emerging doctrine. 
2. Roadblocks to the Normative Inquiry 
Although none provide compelling reasons to forgo the normative in-
quiry, there are several possible explanations for why the judiciary and acad-
emy have not yet engaged in deeper examinations of the trade-off. The five 
main reasons are outlined below. 
First, courts frequently have to decide the cases before them without en-
gaging in a more philosophical inquiry about first principles.330 This is proba-
bly especially prevalent in discovery disputes because of the rise in docket-
management pressures and the degree to which judicial management of dis-
covery is highly deferential to the trial courts.331 Accordingly, it is unsurpris-
ing that few judges have waxed poetic about the first principle issues raised, 
perhaps only tangentially or hypothetically, by pre-trial procedural disputes. 
Second, many analyses have not fully appreciated that predictive coding 
is a fundamentally different type of tool than earlier ESI search methods.332 
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And this mischaracterization, which ignores predictive coding’s lack of easily 
intelligible explanations of the causal relationships between the results and 
the underlying legal substance, naturally leads away from a new examination 
of the normative trade-off.333 
Third, although challenged by scholars in the context of broader discus-
sions about discovery, economic efficiency (as understood to be a focus on 
reducing the measurable financial costs of litigation) is the ascendant norm.334 
And the proportionality requirement embedded in Rule 26 has been under-
stood to require this sort of economic efficiency inquiry.335 Thus, it is no sur-
prise that courts have looked at the accuracy and cost-efficiency of predictive 
coding. 
Fourth, there might be a Maslow-like hierarchy of needs specific to ju-
risprudence in which legal analyses move from the most pragmatic concerns 
to the more abstract.336 In the context of predictive coding in civil discovery, 
the first analyses focused on whether the processes worked at their most basic 
level, asking whether the results were better than alternative methods at get-
ting the right material in a cost-efficient manner.337 Next, courts and scholars 
thought about the second-order implications of how the processes fit more or 
less easily within the existing case law.338 And, as this Article begins to do, 
the third step is examining how the processes either serve or challenge the 
underlying first principle norms—other than accuracy and cost-efficiency—
that animate the jurisprudence as a whole. 
Fifth, technology can have a glamour of objectivity and prestige.339 This 
is particularly true with automated processes involving machine-learning al-
gorithms.340 One might see the technological element itself acting as a substi-
tute for more substantive legal explanations because it carries with it a differ-
ent, but still weighty, imprimatur of authority. 
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3. Need to Futureproof 
Although predictive coding in civil discovery is not typically used in 
cases involving a poorer party with a small-value claim, now is the time for 
incorporating participation-norm concerns into the emerging doctrine. The 
growth of ESI and the focus on proportionality make it likely that predictive 
coding will spread to new contexts involving parties with fewer financial re-
sources.341 And the participation-norms matter even more for such parties, 
implicating equality issues in addition to the procedural justice elements de-
scribed above.342 Taken together, this raises important questions about a fail-
ure to futureproof the jurisprudence and the risks of calcification. 
Futureproofing refers to the practice of developing law to remain rele-
vant despite extrinsic changes over time.343 With technology that changes 
faster than lawmakers or courts can respond, futureproofing is necessary to 
avoid obsolescence.344 And the benefits of such a stable doctrine are the en-
hancement of uniformity and certainty.345 
While stability within the common-law system has its upsides, there also 
are risks of calcification, which are particularly salient when the formative 
period is not reflective of the forthcoming context. Legal practices, which 
might not be theoretically justifiable on their merits, can harden into a long-
standing doctrine with unintended effects.346 And these unintended effects can 
disadvantage vulnerable parties who were never affirmatively considered. For 
example, the proportionality issue primarily operates in high-value cases but 
it has, without much in the way of explicit deliberation or justification, mi-
grated to lower-stakes cases.347 And, as discussed above, predictive coding 
exacerbates the ways in which privileging proportionality can negatively im-
pact the participation norm.348 
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The doctrinal upshot is that courts should futureproof the emerging doc-
trine of predictive coding in civil discovery by including an explicit and fact-
informed weighing of the participation norm. As with most discovery issues, 
a case-by-case Mathews assessment will best enhance the efficient and just 
workings of litigation. But such a balancing test must both include all of the 
important normative considerations and account for the practical application 
modifications that might be necessary to account for differently situated liti-
gants. 
4. Potential Non-Doctrinal Ways to Ameliorate Predictive Coding’s Impact 
on the Participation Norm 
The doctrinal fix suggested above, however, is not the only possible 
method for dealing with how predictive coding’s opacity might negatively 
impact the norm of participation for litigants without significant financial re-
sources. There are other available tactics and some of the contextual aspects 
might change too. 
It is possible that some of the pressures leading to the increased use of 
predictive coding might lessen. While the growth of ESI is unlikely to slow, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could be amended to better reflect the 
normative trade-off, putting a renewed focus on the participation norm.349 
Although the 2015 amendments went in the other direction,350 other regulato-
ry proposals show an increased interest in ensuring that legal structures pro-
tect people who lack significant financial resources.351 
Additionally, just as predictive coding has been suggested as a techno-
logical fix for the problem of the deluge of ESI, more advanced predictive 
coding technologies might solve the intelligibility problem.352 Some vendors 
have already started touting the ability of their software to explain the under-
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lying rationales.353 And lawyers and courts can use their powers over legal 
processes—that is, their ability to hire vendors and approve processes, respec-
tively—to further accelerate these developments.354 
Another solution would be to address how the cost of experts impedes 
poorer parties from being able to successfully navigate the civil litigation pro-
cess.355 For example, courts may appoint experts and shift the costs of experts 
to the losing parties.356 Legislative fixes could expand the universe of cases in 
which fee-shifting for the cost of experts is permitted.357 Another long-term 
strategy might be to develop a constitutional right to court-appointed expert 
assistance under the due process clause.358 This could take the form of a 
court-appointed special master.359 Some professional organizations encourage 
their members to volunteer services to people in need— although it can be 
difficult for indigent parties to connect with these sorts of pro bono offer-
ings.360 To the extent access to experts hinges on funding, lawyers can ad-
vance these expenses, and the growth of litigation funding might also portend 
decreased barriers.361 Simpler, more elegant solutions geared specifically to-
wards predictive coding access might be for the bar to develop an open-
source predictive coding tool, contract for group licenses, or implement a 
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compulsory licensing scheme.362 Although increased access does not neces-
sarily go directly to intelligibility, it would give litigants without significant 
financial resources first-hand exposure to the technology. 
Lawyers’ gamesmanship was identified as another driver of the rise of 
predictive coding.363 Accordingly, changes in professional responsibility 
norms or rules might reduce the impact of predictive coding on the participa-
tion norm. For example, lawyers might cooperate further to reduce discovery 
disputes. They also could be more transparent about their predictive coding 
processes, using economic pressure to make their vendors explain some of 
the mechanisms beyond just the classification decisions in the seed set. This, 
however, is not meant to suggest that mechanical transparency is equivalent 
to causative legal explanations. But mechanical transparency as to the algo-
rithms would, at least, be a start. 
Even more likely, shifts in technological competence might make gener-
alist lawyers better able to navigate the intricacies of predictive coding. Cur-
rently, professional responsibility rules set a very low bar for lawyers’ techno-
logical competence.364 But this is changing. For example, Magistrate Judge 
James Francis has said: 
E-Discovery is pervasive. It’s like understanding civil procedure. 
You’re not going to be a civil litigator without understanding the 
rules of civil procedure. Similarly, you’re no longer going to be 
able to conduct litigation of any complexity without understanding 
E-Discovery.365  
Some legal practitioners have even argued that the use of predictive cod-
ing will itself become an ethical obligation.366 And developing competence 
will be easier if the protocols become more standardized, resolving the im-
plementation controversies described above in Part III(C).367 
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Less likely, but no less importantly, litigation actors—be they parties, at-
torneys, or judges—might more fully integrate an ethical obligation that goes 
beyond the mere tactical adherence to the rules. Instead, they might better 
incorporate their responsibility to the underlying norms of procedural justice 
into their practices.368 Recognition of the shared responsibility for ensuring 
truly just processes can only serve to enhance the legitimacy of the legal sys-
tem and, ultimately, the welfare of society.369 And one aspect of this ethical 
obligation is ensuring that every aspect of the litigation process is intelligibly 
tied to the underlying legal substance.370 
CONCLUSION 
Legal doctrines must serve first-principles norms. And, in discovery, the 
norm of participation is a fundamental principle, ultimately contributing to 
the legitimacy of judicial processes. In civil discovery, this norm is negatively 
impacted by predictive coding’s opacity, particularly as projected for litigants 
without the financial resources necessary to hire technological experts. But 
the trade-off between the norms of accuracy and cost-efficiency on one hand 
and participation on the other has not been sufficiently interrogated in either 
the prior academic or judicial evaluations. Now that predictive coding has 
passed the initial factual and second-order legal thresholds, this higher-level 
normative discussion should begin. Contributing to this need for examination 
of the normative trade-off, the continuing growth of ESI and the downward 
pressure of the proportionality amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b) mean that predictive coding likely will spread to more cases. And there 
is a risk that the current doctrine will ossify, leaving out the concerns of the 
litigants who both lack significant financial resources and are not generally 
participating in the contemporary cases through which the jurisprudence is 
developing. Given these factors, courts should include the potential stress on 
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the participation norm in their case-by-case Mathews analyses when manag-
ing discovery disputes involving predictive coding to better futureproof the 
emerging doctrine. 
Predictive coding in civil discovery is not the only area in which rapid 
technological advances—most saliently, the increased prevalence of big data 
and artificial intelligence—raise concerns about the ability of legal doctrines 
to adapt. And, although predictive coding presents issues specific to itself, the 
general lesson remains the same: procedurally just doctrines must account for 
technological changes and balance their benefits against the risk that their lay 
impenetrability might diminish the meaningful participation of less sophisti-
cated litigants in legal processes. 
  
 
